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Abstract 
 
Administrative  agencies  frequently  say  “not  now.”  They  defer  decisions 
about rulemaking or adjudication, or decide not to decide. When is it lawful 
for  them  to  do  so?  A  substantial  degree  of  agency  autonomy  is 
guaranteed  by  a  recognition  of  resource  constraints,  which  require 
agencies  to  set  priorities,  often  with  reference  to  their  independent 
assessments of the relative importance of legislative policies. Unless a fair 
reading of congressional instructions suggests otherwise, agencies may 
also  defer  decisions  because  of  their  own  policy  judgments  about 
appropriate timing. At the same time, agencies may not defer decisions, or 
decide not to decide, if Congress has imposed a statutory deadline, or if 
their  failure  to  act  amounts  to  a  circumvention  of  express  or  implied 
statutory requirements, or amounts to an abdication of the agency’s basic 
responsibility to promote and enforce policies established by Congress.  
 
  Every day of every year, administrative agencies must decide what and whether 
to decide. An agency might be asked to decide, now, whether to initiate a rulemaking in 
which it will have to decide what the relevant rule will be on a given topic -- involving, for 
example, air quality, automobile safety, airport security, health care, for-profit education, 
or financial stability. An agency might be asked to decide, now, whether to initiate an 
adjudicatory proceeding that will require the agency to decide later whether a regulated 
party  has  or  has  not  violated  a  statute  or  regulation.  The  number  of  potential 
rulemakings is very high, and the same is true for adjudications, and agencies must 
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necessarily  defer  numerous  decisions  until  a  later  time.  In  ways  both  formal  and 
informal, decisions to decide are ubiquitous in the administrative state. 
 
  With respect to rulemaking and adjudication, how does law shape and constrain 
agency decisions whether to decide? The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts 
to compel agency action “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”
1 It also allows 
people to file petitions to make rules; agency responses to such petitions are subject to 
judicial review, albeit with an unusual degree of deference.
2 The Supreme Court has 
addressed  the  issue  of  deferred  action  on  several  occasions,
3 most  recently  in 
Massachusetts  v.  Environmental  Protection  Agency,  which  held  inter  alia  that  the 
Environmental Protection Agency had not given adequate reasons for its denial of a 
petition  to  initiate  a  rulemaking  with  respect  to  carbon  dioxide  emissions  from  new 
automobiles.
4 
 
As we will see, however, Massachusetts v. EPA is ambiguous in crucial respects. 
On a broad reading, supported by important passages in the opinion, the Court seems 
to hold that in deciding whether to decide, agencies may consider only the same factors 
that would be relevant to the primary decision itself.
5 This is a puzzling holding, one that 
is flatly inconsistent with precedent, not to mention the realities of agency behavior and 
the  larger  structure  of  administrative  law.  Agencies  frequently  decline  to  initiate 
rulemaking  because  of  resource  constraints,  even  if  such  constraints  are  legally 
irrelevant to the agency’s permissible judgment, on the merits, about the the appropriate 
content  of  the  rule,  if  it  is  issued.  And  as  we  shall  see,  agencies  frequently  defer 
decisions  for  reasons  that  may  not  lawfully  be  taken  into  account  when  they  are 
promulgating rules or issuing orders. Since Massachusetts v. EPA, lower courts and 
commentators have wrestled with the problem of how to assess agency decisions about 
whether  to  decide,
6 and  have  recognized  the  legitimacy  of  considering  resource 
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1 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006). 
2 See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007). 
3 See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 
(1985). 
4 549 U.S. at 534. 
5 Id. at 533-35. 
6 Two circuit court cases seem to have politely ignored the controversial holding of Massachusetts v. 
EPA; these courts have upheld agency denials of rulemaking petitions without asking whether the denials 
were justifiable in light of the statutory factors relevant to the underlying decision itself. See Preminger v. 
Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 632 F.3d 1345, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (not asking whether agency’s reasons 
for denial were statutorily permissible or relevant to the subject of the rulemaking petition); Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (same). As for commentary, a useful treatment of 
related issues is Sharon Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive Virtues (Oct. 29, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the authors). For an earlier effort by one of us, see Jody Freeman & Adrian 
Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2007). An analysis  Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2355493 
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constraints  and  other  factors  not  relevant  to  the  decision  how  to  proceed,  given  a 
decision to proceed.
7 Yet no clear account has emerged on the crucial question: what 
are  the  permissible  grounds  on  which  agencies  may,  or  may  not,  defer  decisions? 
When are agencies authorized to say “not now”? 
 
  Our aim here is to offer an account of the law of “not now” -- of the conditions 
under which, and the grounds on which, agencies may defer action or decide not to 
decide. As we shall see, the easiest cases involve resource constraints. Agencies have 
limited budgets and a large menu of options, and they may legitimately decide to pursue 
some options but not others. If an agency declines to engage in rulemaking not because 
it thinks that any rule would be a bad idea but because it has higher priorities, it is 
entitled  to  defer  its  decision.  This  principle  of  priority-setting
8 captures  a  significant 
amount of the territory of decisions not to decide. It ensures that most such decisions 
are legally  unobjectionable, even if those in the private sector believe, rightly, that the 
issue is important and deserves public attention. 
 
  More  controversially,  and  consistent  with  the  principle  of  priority-setting,  we 
suggest  that  agencies  are  often  permitted  to  defer  decisions  because  of  policy 
judgments that do not involve resource constraints and that are, in a sense, extrinsic to 
the  statutes  involved.  An  agency  might  believe,  for  example,  that  regulatory  action 
would  adversely  affect  our  nation’s  relationships  with  our  trading  partners,  or  that  it 
would impose high costs on a sector that is now facing serious economic difficulty. The 
legality of an agency’s decision to defer its decision, motivated by considerations of this 
kind, depends on the best reading of congressional instructions. We suggest that unless 
the context suggests otherwise, agencies may generally invoke extrinsic considerations 
if Congress has merely authorized, but not mandated, agency action. The analysis must 
be  different  where  the  underlying  statute  expressly  states  or  else  presupposes,  by 
necessary implication, that the agency may not defer decisions or must decide one way 
or another. If so, agencies may not defer decision or refuse to decide. 
 
   With these points in mind, we suggest that broad as it is, agency discretion to 
defer decisions is subject to three important constraints. First, no such decision may 
violate statutory deadlines. If a statute requires an agency to reach a decision by a date 
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that predates Massachusetts v. EPA, but is still illuminating, is Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of 
Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657 (2004).  
7 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, 532 F.3d at 921 (upholding an agency rejection of a rulemaking petition 
based on preserving resources for another rulemaking), DiGiovanni v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 249 F. App'x 
842, 844 (2d Cir. 2007) (accepting resource constraints and competing agency priorities as valid reasons 
for rejecting a rulemaking petition). 
8 Priority-setting  and  resource  allocation  are  discussed  in  Eric  Biber,  The  Importance  of  Resource 
Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2008), and Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: 
Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461 (2008). 4 
certain, the agency must respect that requirement.
9 Second, even in the absence of a 
statutory deadline, agencies are subject to a general anti-circumvention principle: when 
deciding  whether  to  decide,  agencies  may  not  circumvent  express  or  implied 
congressional instructions by deferring action.
10 Suppose, for example, that Congress 
has conditioned a policy on whether agencies make certain findings and made clear 
that agencies may not decline to make such findings, or that Congress has said that 
agencies “shall” take certain action. If so, agencies retain some control over timing, and 
that control may be significant, but they may not indefinitely defer such action simply 
because  they  would  prefer  not  to  take  it,  or  because  they  disagree  with  the  policy 
judgment incorporated in the statute. 
 
  Third,  and  generalizing  from  an  idea  already  found  in  one  corner  of 
administrative-law doctrine, we will suggest an ultimate constraint: Agencies may not 
invoke  their  ability  to  allocate  limited  resources  in  such  a  way  as  to  abdicate  their 
statutory  responsibilities.  While  application  and  enforcement  of  the  principle  are 
complex, the core idea is simple: resource allocation is an entirely legitimate ground for 
moving particular agency action to the end of the queue, but the best reading of certain 
statutes is that resource allocation may not be repeatedly invoked in order to keep a 
particular  action  at  the  back  of  the  queue  forever.  The  risk  with  such  repeated 
invocations is that they might be inconsistent with congressional instructions, which may 
be best read to require due consideration of the relevant issues, even while allowing 
agencies substantial flexibility with respect to timing.  
 
This anti-abdication principle is admittedly vague and not easily subject to judicial 
administration,  but  as  we  shall  see,  it  has  already  been  made  part  of  the  law  of 
reviewability of administrative (in)action. Because of the difficulties in administering the 
principle, it will usually amount to a judicially underenforced constraint, but it remains an 
important backstop that judges may invoke in extreme cases. Whether or not courts are 
involved, it is a limitation that agencies must nonetheless obey if they are to remain 
faithful to the law.  We will flesh  out the principle through illustrative cases.  
 
  Part I motivates our discussion. We introduce some stylized problems, all based 
on real problems that real agencies have faced, and give a brief primer on relevant 
doctrine. Part II explores priority-setting and constraints on priority-setting, based on the 
anti-circumvention and anti-abdication principles. To illustrate those principles, Part III 
turns to a large number of imaginable cases, easy and hard.  A brief conclusion follows. 
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9 See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. C 12-4529 PJH, 2013 WL 1741816, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 
2013). 
10 See Freeman and Vermeule, supra note ___, 2007 S. Ct. Rev. at 83-88. 5 
 
I. Problems and Precedents 
 
We begin in Part I.A with a series of stylized problems in which agencies decide 
whether  to  decide,  ultimately  saying,  “not  now.”  The  stylization  is  an  expositional 
convenience that allows us to bring out the legally relevant features of the problems 
cleanly; all the problems have messier real-world analogues, as we will make clear. Part 
I.B sketches the relevant administrative law doctrine, which has important silences and 
ambiguities.  
 
A. Problems 
 
1. “Genocide”? 
 
Transylvanistan  is  a  democratic  state  and  an  ally  of  the  United  States.  The 
United  States  has  long  supplied  Transylvanistan  with  annual  grants  of  foreign  aid, 
principally in the form of “foreign military assistance” -- grants to fund cooperation and 
joint training between the armed forces of Transylvanistan and the United States. There 
is a federal statute on the books specifying that if the Secretary of State determines that 
a “genocide” is occurring in any nation receiving foreign military assistance, the aid must 
be cut off unconditionally. 
 
In 2014, the Transylvanistanian government initiates what most people consider 
to be a genocide against a minority group in that nation. Defenders of that group call on 
the United States, through the Department of State, to make a determination, under the 
relevant  statute,  that  there  has  been  a  “genocide”  in  Transylvanistan.  The  State 
Department issues a press release stating that “the Secretary of State has decided that 
she will not, at this time, make a determination whether there has been a ‘genocide’ in 
Transylvanistan  in  the  legal  sense.”  Foreign  military  assistance  continues  to  flow  to  
Transylvanistan.
11 
 
On what grounds may the Secretary make such a decision not to decide? Would 
it  matter  if  the  Secretary  believed  strongly  that  cutting  off  military  assistance  to 
Transylvanistan would seriously harm United States interests in the region and indeed 
throughout the world? Would it matter if the Secretary was simultaneously coping with 
serious emergencies elsewhere? 
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11 This  hypothetical  has  evident  similarities  to  the  question  raised  in  2012  about  whether  the  United 
States was required to cut off funds to Egypt on the ground that a military coup had occurred in that 
nation. We do not mean to express any view here on the Egypt question, which involves an assortment of 
factual and other complexities.  6 
2. Workplace Safety  
 
With  respect  to  toxic  substances,  the  Occupational  Safety  and  Health 
Administration (OSHA) is required to issue standards that meet two conditions: they 
must address a “significant risk”; and they must be economically and technologically 
“feasible.”
12 OSHA has been asked to consider issuing a new standard for pilene, a 
carcinogenic  substance.  The  new  standard  would  be  expensive,  costing  at  least  $1 
billion per year. The monetized benefits are disputed, but preliminary work suggests that 
they would range between $700 million and $1.6 billion. It seems clear that at current 
levels, pilene imposes a significant risk on workers; it also seems clear that even at a 
cost of $1.6 billion, a new standard would be feasible. 
 
  Nonetheless, OSHA decides to defer its decision. It does so on the ground that 
the nation is in the midst of serious economic difficulties, and much of the cost of a new 
pilene  standard  would  be  borne  by  the  construction  industry,  which  continues  to 
struggle. OSHA believes that it should focus on rules and actions that would not have 
adverse effects on sectors of the economy that are facing serious economic troubles, in 
part because such rules and actions would ultimately hurt workers. It acknowledges that 
if it decides to proceed, it is then forbidden to consider the potentially adverse effects of 
costly regulation on workers themselves; but it denies that the same prohibition applies 
at the stage of deciding to defer a decision.  
 
Is it unlawful for OSHA to decline to act at this time? May OSHA invoke the 
stated rationale in response to a petition to initiate rulemaking? Does it matter if OSHA 
is  issuing,  in  the  relevant  period,  a  significant  number  of  other  rules  designed  to 
promote workplace safety? 
 
3. Nitrogen Oxide 
 
Under  the  Clean  Air  Act,  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  must 
decide  whether  to  establish  new  national  ambient  air  quality  standards  every  five 
years.
13 The EPA also has discretion to establish new standards before the five-year 
period has elapsed.
14 With respect to the stringency of the standards that it issues, the 
EPA is forbidden from considering costs.
15 It must select standards that are “requisite to 
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12 See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-40 (1980). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (2012). 
14 Id. 
15 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn., 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001). 7 
protect the public health,” with “an adequate margin of safety.”
16 In issuing standards, 
the EPA must consider public health without reference to the cost of achieving it.
17 
 
Two  years  after  finalizing  a  nitrogen  standard,  the  EPA  receives  scientific 
evidence  that  a  significantly  more  stringent  standard  for  nitrogen  oxide  would  be 
“requisite to protect the public health.” The EPA is convinced by that evidence, but it is 
nonetheless reluctant to issue a new standard, because it believes that its costs would 
be too high to justify its benefits. It concludes that the monetized costs of the resulting 
rule would be $6 billion and that the monetized benefits would be $900 million. EPA 
defers its decision on precisely that ground. It is aware that comparison of costs and 
benefits is not legitimate when it is deciding on the stringency of national ambient air 
quality standards, but it insists that it is permitted to engage in that comparison when it 
is deciding whether to proceed, when it has discretion not to do so. Until the 5-year 
deadline is reached, EPA believes, it does have that discretion. 
 
Has the EPA acted unlawfully? Would the answer be different if in the relevant 
period, the agency was issuing a large volume of air pollution rules?  
 
4. FDA and Genetically Modified Food 
 
Many people are concerned about genetically modified food, and they believe 
that they have a “right to know” whether the food that they are purchasing is genetically 
modified.
18 For that reason, they have petitioned the FDA to require labeling. The FDA  
consults  the  relevant  statute  and  finds  that  the  underlying  questions  are  reasonably 
disputed; it believes that the key provisions are ambiguous and if it were seriously to 
engage the underlying questions, it is not sure how it would resolve the ambiguity.
19  
The FDA declines to decide because of an extrinsic factor: any labelling requirement 
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16 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
17 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 471. 
18 See, e.g., Kyung M. Song, GMO food-label vote may have consequences in Congress, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2022149481_gmofederalxml.html.  
19 In fact the FDA has concluded that it lacks the authority to require labelling: "FDA has also been asked 
whether foods developed using techniques such as recombinant DNA techniques would be required to 
bear special labeling to reveal that fact to consumers. . . .  The agency is not aware of any information 
showing that foods derived by these new methods differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform 
way, or that, as a class, foods developed by the new techniques present any different or greater safety 
concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding. For this reason, the agency does not believe 
that the method of development of a new plant variety (including the use of new techniques including 
recombinant DNA techniques) is normally material information within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 321(n) 
and would not usually be required to be disclosed in labeling for the food." Statement of Policy: Foods 
Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 FR 22984-01, 22991 (1992) 8 
would  have  serious  implications  for  international  trade.
20 The  FDA  defers  decision 
because  it  does  not  want  to  complicate  ongoing  discussions  with  important  trading 
partners.  The  FDA  acknowledges  that  effects  on  international  trade  would  not  be  a 
legitimate consideration if it had initiated rulemaking on the labeling issue.  
 
It is unlawful for FDA to give consideration to those effects? Does it matter if the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the Department of State are strongly 
supportive of its decision to defer its decision? 
 
B. Precedents 
 
  What  does  administrative  law  say  about  problems  of  the  sort  we  have 
canvassed?  It  says  a  great  deal,  but  it  leave  central  questions  unresolved.  Current 
administrative law structures the analysis in useful ways, but it also contains important 
silences and ambiguities. 
 
1. Programs vs. discrete action. What sort of agency behavior may be challenged, 
in court, on the ground that the agency has failed to do or decide something that it 
should have done, or should have decided
21? Not everything that agencies do or fail to 
do may be challenged, because not everything that agencies do or fail to do counts as 
“agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court has 
held  that  the  APA  reaches  only  discrete  agency  action,  as  opposed  to  broad 
administration of programs.
22 The APA is triggered if, but only if, agency administration 
of a program culminates in discrete action such as adjudication or rulemaking, or in 
failure or refusal to take a discrete action. 
 
The  Court  has  also  said  that  discrete  agency  inaction  may  be  challenged  as 
“action  unlawfully  withheld”  under  APA  §  706  only  if  the  action  is  mandatory  and 
required by law, as opposed to discretionary.
23 By contrast, action committed to agency 
discretion is, by the terms of § 706(a), unreviewable in court. This further holding should 
not  be  read  too  broadly,  however.  In  particular,  there  is  an  entirely  separate  set  of 
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20 See, e.g., Letter from Max Baucus, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., to Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade 
Representative (Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=17b2fd73-067d-4a4a-a50f-a00265efbf67 
(“Broad bipartisan Congressional support for expanding trade with the EU depends, in large part, on 
lowering trade barriers for American agricultural products . . . . including the EU’s restrictions on 
genetically engineered crops . . .”). 
21 We are also concerned with the legality of decisions to defer even if judicial review is unavailable, but 
the principles governing judicial review of such decisions capture most of the relevant territory (with the 
qualification that the anti-abdication principle is broader than its feasible judicial enforcement, see below). 
22 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62 (2004). 
23 Id. at 63. 9 
questions about when parties aggrieved by agency failure to take discrete and entirely 
discretionary action may challenge the reasons that agencies give for declining to take 
action, or the grounds on which agencies defer a decision. If, for example, an agency 
acts or fails to act for reasons that are constitutionally objectionable, judicial review is 
highly likely to be available.
24 One way to read this principle is to suggest that agencies 
are under a mandatory duty to rely on legitimate reasons, or under a mandatory duty 
not to rely on illegitimate reasons. 
 
As we will see, in both adjudication and rulemaking, there are conditions under 
which courts will allow parties to argue that agencies have given invalid grounds for the 
exercise  of  discretion  not  to  take  action,  including  decisions  not  to  decide.  Under 
Overton  Park,
25 agencies  subject  to  arbitrariness  review  must  “consider  the  relevant 
factors” and avoid a “clear error of judgment.” Where an agency gives an invalid reason 
for discretionary action, it has -- absent any special circumstances -- acted unlawfully 
under  §  706  of  the  APA,  and  while  inaction  and  decisions  to  defer  raise  special 
considerations, courts are sometimes authorized to review the agency’s decisionmaking 
or non-decisionmaking on that score.
26 
 
2. Enforcement vs. adjudication.  Suppose that a discrete action or inaction is 
indeed at issue. What sort of discrete action exactly? Under the APA, there are two 
possibilities.  Agency  action  may  be  rulemaking,  if  the  action  satisfies  the  APA’s 
definition of a “rule,” or it may be adjudication, the process leading to the formulation of 
an “order” -- defined in catchall terms as anything that is not a rule.
27 We will use the 
term “enforcement” to refer to an agency decision to initiate an adjudication that may 
lead to an order finding liability against a regulated party or enjoining a regulated party 
to take or not to take action. 
 
The  Court  has  examined  agency  decisions  not  to  initiate  enforcement 
proceedings, an important species of decisions not to decide, and has declared those 
decisions presumptively off-limits to the courts. In Heckler v. Chaney,
28 the FDA was 
asked  to  initiate  an  enforcement  proceeding  to  bar  states  that  conduct  capital 
punishment from using regulated drugs for lethal injections; the petitioners argued that 
this was an off-label use of the drugs that was unlawful under the relevant statute.
29 The 
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24 See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-604 (1988); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985). 
25 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
26 See below. 
27 5  U.S.C.  §  551  (2012).  We  are  bracketing  a  wide  range  of  agency  actions  that  do  not  count  as 
regulations or orders, such as general statements of policy and interpretative rules. See 5 USC § 553 
(2012). 
28 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
29 470 U.S. at 823-24. 10 
Court would have none of it, refusing even to entertain the challenge on the merits. 
Agency decisions not to enforce, it announced, are presumptively non-reviewable under 
§  701(a)(2)  of  the  APA,  because  they  are  presumptively  “committed  to  agency 
discretion by law.”
30 
 
The Court acknowledged that clear statutory commands trump everything else. 
Reviewability might obtain -- the presumption of unreviewability might be overcome -- if 
Congress  clearly  mandated  enforcement  in  certain  circumstances  or  otherwise 
constrained the agency’s discretion to decide whether to enforce.
31 Yet in the ordinary 
case, in which statutes are silent or unclear on such questions, agencies will not have to 
justify,  to  courts,  their  decisions  not  to  undertake  enforcement.  Any  “not  now”  is 
presumed  unreviewable.  A  concurrence  by  Justice  Brennan  warned  that  under  the 
Court’s approach, agencies might abdicate their enforcement responsibilities entirely
32; 
a concurrence by Justice Marshall argued that the decision was reviewable, but was 
also clearly justifiable under arbitrary-and-capricious review, because the agency had 
perfectly good reasons not to let its regulatory agenda be hijacked by suits of this sort.
33 
 
Both  the  majority  and  the  concurrences  in  Heckler  emphasized  two  crucial 
principles that we will generalize and adapt to other settings, and that -- as the Marshall 
concurrence argues -- are relevant to the merits of arbitrariness review as well as to the 
threshold issue of reviewability. The first is resource allocation and priority-setting. In the 
Court’s view, enforcement decisions must be presumed to be unreviewable because 
agencies inevitably face scarcity and constraints on resources that can be devoted to 
enforcement.  Thus  agencies  must  necessarily  set  priorities  among  possible  actions, 
based on a myriad of imponderable factors that courts are ill-suited to assess.
34 Thus 
the Court emphasized that 
 
the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but 
whether agency resources are better spent on this violation or another, 
whether the agency is likely to success if its act, whether the particular 
enforcement  action  best  fits  the  agency’s  overall  policies,  and  indeed, 
whether  the  agency  has  enough  resources  to  undertake  the  action  at 
all . . . . The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the 
many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.
35 
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30 Id. at 835 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012)). 
31 See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566-68 (1975). 
32 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
33 Id. at 840-41 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). 
34 See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32. 
35 Id. 11 
 
Although this point may have special force where enforcement is concerned, it is 
relevant more broadly as well. It is sometimes suggested that the Heckler Court saw a 
unique connection between enforcement and resource-allocation, but the opposite is 
actually true. The Court itself said that resource allocation underpins two other critical 
administrative-law doctrines: the Vermont Yankee holding that bars courts from adding 
procedural requirements to the informal rulemaking procedures of the APA,
36 and the 
principle -- now known as the Chevron doctrine
37 -- that courts will generally defer to an 
agency’s construction of the statute that it is charged with implementing.
38 
 
The  second  principle  mentioned  by  the  Heckler  Court,  as  well  as  the 
concurrences,  is  the  anti-abdication  principle.  In  a  footnote,  the  Court  raised  the 
possibility that the presumption of unreviewability might not apply in “a situation where it 
could  justifiably  be  found  that  the  agency  has  consciously  and  expressly  adopted  a 
general  policy  that  is  so  extreme  as  to  amount  to  an  abdication  of  its  statutory 
responsibilities.”
39 The  Court  said  that  “in  these  situations  the  statute  conferring 
authority  on  the  agency  might  indicate  that  such  decisions  were  not  ‘committed  to 
agency  discretion.’”
40 Aside  from  a  citation  of  a  case  that  invalidated  an  agency’s 
apparently wholesale refusal to implement a civil rights statute over a lengthy period of 
time,
41 the Court gave little indication of what might count as abdication, how abdication 
relates to priority-setting, or how courts are supposed to recognize abdication when it 
occurs. We will return to these questions. 
 
  3. Rulemaking. Do the principles announced in Heckler apply to rulemaking, as 
opposed  to  adjudication?  In  one  sense,  the  answer  is  now  plain:  notwithstanding 
Heckler,  courts  may  review  an  agency’s  negative  response  to  a  petition  to  initiate 
rulemaking. But in some respects,  the full answer is “yes and no.”  
 
The  currently  governing  law  stems  from  Massachusetts  v.  EPA,
42 decided  in 
2007. We will suggest that the decision is ambiguous in critical respects, and that the 
broadest  possible  reading  of  the  decision  fits  poorly  with  the  larger  structure  of 
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36 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523-25 (1978). 
This holding was later extended to include informal adjudication. See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV 
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653-55 (1990). 
37 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
38 See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832. For a more recent suggestion that resource allocation justifies deference 
to agency statutory interpretations under Chevron, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007). 
39 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
40 Id.  
41 See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
42 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 12 
administrative law (and has been correctly ignored
43). Yet Massachusetts v. EPA can be 
understood to stand for a critical principle -- the anti-circumvention principle -- that we 
will incorporate into our suggested framework. 
 
 As relevant here, the main question in Massachusetts v. EPA was whether the 
agency  could  lawfully  decline  to  make  a  “judgment”  about  whether  emissions  of 
greenhouse  gases  from  new  automobiles  amounted  to  “air  pollutants”  within  the 
meaning of the Clean Air Act. The petitioners asked the EPA to initiate a rulemaking to 
make that judgment, but the EPA refused to do so, offering two main reasons. First, the 
agency stated its belief that it lacked statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions from new automobiles as air pollutants. The Court rejected that position, but 
on this count, its ruling is tangential to our question and we will not discuss it here.  
 
Second -- and this is crucial for our purposes -- the EPA assumed that it had 
statutory  authority  to  proceed,  but  announced  that  it  would  nonetheless  exercise  its 
discretion to decline to make the relevant judgment. By way of explanation, the EPA 
cited a series of reasons, including residual scientific uncertainty about the effects of 
greenhouse gases, ongoing study of the relevant policy questions by other agencies, 
and a reluctance to interfere with ongoing foreign negotiations by the administration 
over climate change treaties and policy. 
 
The Court thus had two questions to decide. The first was whether there could be 
judicial review at all of an agency decision to deny a petition for rulemaking. By analogy 
to Heckler, might this not be a situation in which agency discretion to allocate resources 
among different rulemaking efforts implies that courts should stay out, unless Congress 
directed  otherwise?  The  second  question  was  whether  the  agency’s  proffered 
discretionary reasons for declining to initiate a rulemaking were adequate, or instead 
arbitrary and capricious or violative of the underlying statute. 
 
As  to  the  first  question,  the  Court  held  that  denials  of  petitions  to  initiate  a 
rulemaking  were  reviewable,  although  that  review  would  be  “extremely  limited”  and 
“highly  deferential.”
44 The  Court  rejected  the  analogy  to  Heckler’s  presumption  of 
unreviewability for enforcement decisions. “In contrast to nonenforcement decisions,” 
the Court said, “agency refusals to initiate rulemaking are less frequent, more apt to 
involve legal as opposed to factual analysis, and subject to special formalities, including 
a public explanation."
45 
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43 See supra notes ____. 
44 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 527 (quoting National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Assn. of 
America, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (C.A.D.C.1989)). 
45 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 527 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 13 
 
On the second question, the Court rather brusquely rejected EPA’s discretionary 
grounds for declining to decide whether to regulate. Here is the major ambiguity in the 
opinion; the Court’s discussion can be read in a number of ways, from narrow to broad. 
We will examine the possibilities in that order. 
 
Most narrowly, the Court seemed to suggest that EPA had articulated reasons 
that, by statute, were made the province of other agencies. EPA argued that making a 
judgment  about  greenhouse  gases  would  interfere  with  ongoing  negotiations  over 
climate-change treaties, and more generally with the foreign policy of the United States, 
but the Court saw this as none of EPA’s business: “In the Global Climate Protection Act 
of  1987,  Congress  authorized  the  State  Department—not  EPA—to  formulate  United 
States foreign policy with reference to environmental matters relating to climate.”
46 On 
this  narrow  reading,  the  simple  problem  was  that  other  statutes,  fairly  read, 
unmistakably  committed  the  relevant  decision  elsewhere.    To  this  extent,  EPA  was 
relying on factors that were statutory relevant in that particular sense.  
 
So long as the views of the State Department had not been offered, the case 
would merely stand for the proposition that (absent unusual constitutional problems) 
Congress may allocate decisionmaking authority among agencies as it sees fit.
47 For 
our purposes, that general proposition might be of interest insofar as it suggests that 
agencies may not invoke, as a basis for deferring decisions, interests that are properly 
the  province  of  other  offices  or  departments  of  government.  Perhaps  agencies  can 
respond to that problem by showing that the relevant offices or departments agree with 
them.
48  If  so,  the  Court’s  reasoning  might  be  understood  to  promote,  at  once, 
interagency coordination and public accountability. 
 
A second narrow reading of the opinion is that EPA simply failed to state, with 
sufficient clarity, that it had sufficient reason to defer the making of a judgment. Justice 
Scalia’s dissent argued that EPA had given a perfectly good reason for delay, namely 
that the scientific uncertainty about the effects of greenhouse gases was too great.
49 
The Court’s response is cryptic, but may best be understood to say, simply enough, that 
EPA had not articulated that reason with sufficient force or clarity.
50 Whoever has the 
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46 Id. at 534. 
47 Of course, this proposition would raise further questions. As a general rule, EPA is unlikely to take a 
position  on  a  question  of  international  relations  without  consulting  the  Department  of  State.  Would 
Massachusetts v. EPA have come out differently if EPA could refer to statements from that Department, 
endorsing its position, or even indicating that EPA was merely following it? We believe so. 
48 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534. 
49 Id. at 553-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
50 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534. 14 
better  of  that  debate,  majority  or  dissent,  the  opinion  would,  on  this  view,  raise  no 
theoretically interesting questions of administrative law. The dispute would be entirely 
fact-bound. 
 
There is also, however, a much broader and more consequential reading of the 
opinion. On this view, the Court’s rationale was that the agency’s reasons for deciding 
not to make a judgment “rest[ed] on reasoning divorced from the statutory text . . . . 
[T]he use of the word ‘judgment’ is not a roving license to ignore the statutory text. It is 
but a direction to exercise discretion within defined statutory limits . . . [O]nce EPA has 
responded to a petition for rulemaking, its reasons for action or inaction must conform to 
the authorizing statute.”
51 In other words, the Court’s idea is that at least in a (formal) 
response  to  a  petition  for  rulemaking,  the  legally  relevant  factors,  on  the  question 
whether to make a judgment, are the same factors that the statute makes substantively 
relevant when the judgment itself is made. Remarkably, the Court seems to collapse the 
decision whether to decide into the underlying decision on the merits; it appears to say 
that the factors made relevant by the statute to the latter are the only factors that the 
agency may consider with respect to the former. 
 
From an administrative-law standpoint, this conclusion seems absurd, and some 
commentators  dismiss  it  on  that  ground,  labeling Massachusetts  v.  EPA  as  wrongly 
decided or impossibly confused.
52 How could the same factors be relevant at both levels 
of decision? Surely there might be perfectly good and legally permissible reasons not to 
decide, or to defer decision, that differ from reasons about how much to regulate, given 
a decision to regulate. As we shall see, this objection is ultimately correct, as lower 
courts  have  implicitly  recognized,
53 but  there  is  a  legitimate  concern  underlying  the 
approach of Massachusetts v. EPA, which is that EPA was in effect circumventing the 
statutory scheme. We take up this point shortly, as we elicit the principles behind the 
doctrine. Let us now turn to that discussion. 
 
II. Governing Principles 
 
  Having  examined  some  strands  of  doctrine  and  some  incompletely  theorized 
principles that seem to underlie existing law, we will lay out our account. We emphasize 
that agencies must respect statutory commands, but that when Congress has not said 
otherwise,  their  authority  to  allocate  scarce  resources  authorizes  them  to  defer 
decisions, even when their decision to do so rests on their own independent judgments 
of policy. It follows that agencies may decide that they will not devote limited resources  
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51 Id. at 533-34. 
52 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note __ (manuscript at 47, 53-54). 
53 See supra notes ____. 15 
to  implement  statutory  programs  that  they  believe  to  be  low-priority.  Indeed,  and 
perhaps  more  controversially,  we  suggest  that  apart  from  the  allocation  of  limited 
resources, agencies may use their control over timing to set priorities, even if they are 
relying on factors that could not legitimately be taken into account if agencies did in fact 
choose to proceed.  
 
At the same time, the general principle of priority-setting is subject not only to any 
constraints that come from statutory deadlines but also to a competing principle of anti-
circumvention. That principle aims to prevent agencies from using their discretion over 
decisionmaking  to  sidestep  the  fair  import  of  congressional  instructions,  whether 
express or implied. The principle of priority-setting is also subject to a further constraint, 
involving the illegitimacy of agency abdication, which we interpret as a sustained series 
of deferrals or nondecisions, over time, that relegates a certain policy to a perpetual 
status  of  low  priority.  As  we  will  see,  the  anti-abdication  principle  has  important 
ambiguities and is not easily subject to judicial enforcement, but it is nonetheless a 
principle that agencies must consider if they seek to remain faithful to the law. 
 
A. Statutory Commands 
 
  The  first  point  is  simple  but  fundamental:  agency  discretion  over  decisions 
whether to decide, like agency discretion generally, is subject to statutory limitations -- 
barring discrete categories of questions as to which there is an independent claim of 
constitutionally-grounded  executive  power  under  Article  II.  Absent  constitutional 
constraints, Congress may specify, if it so chooses and if it speaks with sufficient clarity, 
which agencies are entitled to make which decisions and when. Congress may impose 
deadlines  for  decisionmaking,  may  require  findings  as  conditions  precedent  to 
decisionmaking,  and  in  a  myriad  of  other  ways  may  structure  the  processes  of 
decisionmaking so as to promote policy goals. If, for example, a statute requires an 
agency to issue a rule by a specific date, the agency must comply with the requirement, 
even  if  it  has  competing  priorities  and  even  if  it  would  much  prefer  not  to  do  so.
54 
Statutory  deadlines  are  the  simplest  and  most  common  restriction  on  the  general 
discretion conferred by the inevitability of priority-setting. 
 
  Despite its fundamental character, this principle is easy to overlook. We have 
seen that one strand in Massachusetts v. EPA suggests a narrow reading: relevant 
statutes were best read, albeit only by implication, to say that the considerations on 
which EPA relied to justify its nondecision were the province of another entity entirely, 
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54 See, e.g., Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002); Forest Guardians 
v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. C 12-4529 PJH, 
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the State Department. On this reading, no matter how reasonable the EPA’s views, they 
were not views on a topic EPA was authorized to consider. Of course other readings of 
Massachusetts v. EPA are at least equally plausible, as we have mentioned, but the 
structure  of  the  analysis  is  the  important  thing.  The  first  question  is  always  what 
Congress has specified. 
 
B. Priority-Setting: Resource Constraints and Timing 
 
  1. Priorities and resources. Agencies are generally authorized to engage in a 
large  number  of  actions,  and  they  have  limited  resources.  Many  agencies  cannot 
possibly undertake rulemaking or adjudicatory action in all cases in which they have 
both the legal authority and the desire to do so. No less than ordinary people, agencies 
face a “bandwidth” constraint,
55 and they may and indeed must focus on those problems 
that seem to them most pressing.
56 
 
As noted, some regulations come with statutory deadlines; of these, some such 
deadlines are challenging to meet in view of the complexity of the underlying issues. 
Whether or not they want to do so, agencies must nonetheless respect those deadlines, 
which consume scarce resources.
57 In other cases, Congress has not established any 
kind of deadline, but has said that agencies “shall” undertake certain action,
58 and thus 
signaled a stronger requirement than is contained in the word “may.” In some cases, 
regulatory actions fit with presidential or Administration-wide priorities, and thus have a 
particular  claim  on  the  agency’s  attention.  In  the  aftermath  of  attacks  of  9/11,  for 
example, protection of homeland security was a high priority for the Bush Administration, 
and  agencies  devoted  a  great  deal  of  attention  to  that  goal.
59  In  the  Obama 
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(2013). 
56 For  discussion  in  the  context  of  the  executive  branch  in  general,  see  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  On  Not 
Revisiting  Official  Discount  Rates:  Institutional  Inertia  and  the  Social  Cost  of  Carbon,  Am  Econ  Rev 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343379 
57 See cases cited supra note ___. 
58 See Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-189, § 2, 4, 122 
Stat. 639, 639, 642 (requiring that the Secretary of Transportation issue rules on motor vehicles and child 
safety,  but  allowing  the  Secretary  to  “establish  new  deadlines”  an  unlimited  number  of  times  upon 
notification and explanation to Congress); Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1095-97 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(holding that even though the statute did not set specific deadlines, the agency unreasonably delayed 
addressing plaintiff’s rights by failing to discharge their legally obligatory duties for more than six years); 
Brower  v.  Evans,  257  F.3d  1058,  1068-70  (9th  Cir.  2001)  (holding  that  the  Secretary  of  Commerce 
unreasonably delayed research that the statute stated “shall” be the basis for a finding); Pub. Citizen 
Health Research Grp. v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that an agency’s more 
than three year delay in commencing a rulemaking was unreasonable, where the statute instructed that 
“the Secretary shall give due regard to the urgency of the need for [worker safety standards]”). 
59 See Robert L. Strayer, Making the Development of Homeland Security Regulations More Democratic, 
33  OKLA.  CITY  U.  L.  REV.  331,  345-55  (2008)  (describing  examples  of  post-9/11  homeland  security 17 
Administration, implementation of the Affordable Care Act, including promulgation of a 
large number of relevant regulations, has also been a high priority.
60 Agencies are alert 
both to statutory requirements and to presidential goals, both of which ensure that they 
will have to say, with respect to many problems, “now now.” 
 
  In  view  of  the  high  volume  of  potential  actions  and  the  limitations  in  agency 
resources,  agencies  are  entitled  to  set  priorities,  consistent  with  statutory 
requirements.
61 If the Department of Transportation is considering a large number of 
rules to promote traffic safety, it is entitled to proceed with those rules that seem to it 
most pressing. In setting priorities, the Department is permitted to consider a wide range 
of factors.
62 It might decide, for example, that it would like to focus on retrospective 
review  of  existing  regulations,  because  such  review  is  required  by  Executive  Order 
13,563,
63 and  because  it  believes  that  streamlining  regulatory  requirements,  and 
eliminating  unjustified  regulatory  burdens,  are  exceedingly  important  in  the  current 
period.  
 
If the Department devotes its resources to retrospective review of regulations, 
and issues a number of rules that streamline or eliminate existing rules, some potential 
rulemakings might be moved to the back of the queue. More generally, the Department 
might stress that it is part of the Administration, with particular priorities and emphases, 
and it might concentrate its rulemaking activity in areas that fit with those priorities and 
emphases. Indeed, the President might direct it to do so.
64 
 
Alternatively, the Department might conclude that it should proceed only in cases 
in  which  regulations  would  have  clear  or  high  net  benefits,  perhaps  because  of  an 
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60 See, e.g., Exchange, Premium Stabilization Programs, and Market Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 65,046 
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61 See Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law and Biber, Two Sides of the 
Same Coin supra note ___, for extended explorations of this point. 
62 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
63 Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §601 app. at 101-02 (2006 
& Supp. V 2011). 
64 On relationships within the executive branch, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838 (2013). 18 
Administration-wide commitment to cost-benefit balancing.
65 Forced to choose among a 
menu of options, the Department might believe that rules with no net benefits, or low net 
benefits, should be delayed. It might decide to defer decision in such cases, even if 
analysis of costs and benefits is not relevant to its decision how to proceed, if it decided 
to proceed. In general, and subject to qualifications that we will introduce shortly, there 
is no legal objection to judgments of this kind. No statute forbids agencies from making 
such judgments, and it is certainly not arbitrary for them to do so. 
 
  2. Timing without resource constraints. Suppose that an agency decides to defer 
action not because of resource constraints, but because of its own assessment of policy 
priorities  and  appropriate  timing.  Recall  our  previous  illustrations:  An  agency  might 
believe that it is not appropriate to go forward with a particular regulation, at a particular 
time, because of economic difficulties faced by the relevant sector; because of the need 
to proceed with other, related regulations first; because of the need to coordinate the 
action with that of other agencies, perhaps including state and local governments; or 
because of pending discussions or negotiations with other nations. Let us stipulate that 
in each of these cases, the agency’s own limited resources do not impose constraints. 
 
Whether this sort of reasoning is legally acceptable depends on the underlying 
statute. In many cases (and notwithstanding Massachusetts v. EPA), statutes impose 
no  constraints  on  agencies  that  invoke  reasons  of  this  sort.  But  if  there  is  a  clear 
statutory deadline or an express command to decide, the case is easy; the agency must 
act.  Even  in  the  absence  of  such  constraints,  it  may  become  apparent  that  the 
necessary, albeit implied, premises of the statutory scheme require an agency decision 
one way or another, as may be the case in the genocide case discussed earlier. We 
now turn to the relevant principles. 
 
C. Anti-Circumvention 
 
  Suppose Congress has not clearly indicated, one way or another, how or when 
agencies  should  make  decisions  whether  to  decide.  Under  standard  principles  of 
administrative  law,  agencies  enjoy  discretion  with  respect  to  those  questions.  Yet 
agency discretion is not unbounded. Assuming that agency action is reviewable in court, 
the  background  constraint  arises  from  §  706(2)(A)  of  the  APA:  courts  will  set  aside 
agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.” At the level of decisions to decide, no less than at the level of the 
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65 See id. at § 1(b), 215. Executive Order 13,563 requires that a regulation’s benefits justify its costs, to 
the extent permitted by law; our suggestion here is that even if agencies may not impose a cost-benefit 
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underlying decision itself, agencies must “consider the relevant factors” and avoid any 
“clear errors of judgment” (assuming that judicial review is available)  
 
The “relevant factors” question implicates Chevron. It requires agencies not to 
consider any irrelevant factors, and it requires them to consider all relevant ones. Under 
Chevron, agencies have some discretion to decide which factors count as relevant, at 
least  in  the  face  of  statutory  silence  or  ambiguity;  but  it  is  possible  that  agency 
interpretations will fail under either Step 1 or Step 2. 
 
  The difficult question, however, is what the “relevant factors” are where the issue 
is a decision to defer decision. We have seen that, on the broadest possible reading of 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court should be understood to have held that the relevant 
factors for a decision whether to initiate a rulemaking are the same factors that would be 
relevant, under the applicable statute, to the first-level substantive decision about what 
rule to make. Justice Scalia’s dissent condemned that holding, if holding it was, and his 
condemnation at first glance has a great deal of force. Why on earth would the Court 
collapse  the  two  levels  of  decisionmaking  in  such  an  implausible  way?  Surely  the 
considerations that typically bear on the second-order question whether to decide are 
not necessarily the same as the considerations that bear on the decision itself. 
 
Charitably reconstructed, however, the Court was pursuing a concern that might 
be legitimate in some cases, whether or not it was legitimate in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
The  legitimate  concern  is  that  decisions  not  to  decide,  or  to  defer  decisions,  might 
become  a  license  for  perpetual  circumvention  by  agencies  of  policy  choices  that 
Congress was entitled to make and did make.
66 Suppose that EPA really thought that it 
would just be stupid, from the policy point of view, to regulate greenhouse gases as air 
pollutants.  Suppose  also  that  the  relevant  statute,  properly  interpreted,  defined 
greenhouse gases as air pollutants, and thus made the opposite judgment in principle, 
while also leaving EPA discretion as to the “manner, timing, content, and coordination of 
its regulations with those of other agencies.”
67 It would then betray the necessary -- 
albeit  implicit  --  premises  of  the  statutory  instructions,  and  undermine  the  statutory 
scheme, for EPA indefinitely or perpetually to defer judgment on the critical questions. 
EPA might have valid reasons to defer making a judgment about regulation, but it might 
also be the case that EPA is indefinitely delaying for no other reason than disagreement 
with Congress’ underlying policy judgments. 
 
Here the structure of the problem is the same as in the genocide case, discussed 
earlier (even if the answer is much less clear). Congress there granted foreign aid, but 
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66 Freeman and Vermeule, supra note ___, 2007 S. Ct. Rev. at 83-88. 
67 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007). 20 
specified that the aid would be cut off if the agency were to find that a “genocide” had 
occurred. Taken literally, the statute does not command the agency to do anything. May 
the  agency  then  indefinitely  refuse  to  make  a  finding,  either  way,  about  whether  a 
“genocide”  has  occurred?  Certainly  not.  As  we  have  devised  the  scenario,  it  is  an 
unspoken,  but  unavoidable,  premise  of  the  entire  statutory  scheme  --  a  necessary 
implication -- that the agency will and must make a finding one way or another. Even 
though  there  is  neither  a  statutory  deadline  for  making  the  finding  nor  an  express 
statutory command to make the finding, the agency is circumventing or sidestepping the 
fair import of the congressional instructions. 
 
If  circumvention  is  the  concern,  the  Court’s  aim  in  Massachusetts  v.  EPA 
becomes more comprehensible. Its critical holding was essentially prophylactic: by tying 
down agency decisions to decide, confining them to the same factors that govern the 
underlying first-level decision, the Court was hoping to erect a judicially administrable 
barrier to administrative circumvention of statutory policies. Like all prophylactic rules, 
the Court’s barrier, understood in this way, is overbroad; it will necessarily cover some 
cases in which agencies really do have good reasons to defer a decision. 
 
The  concern  about  circumvention  is  legitimate,  but  the  commentators  who 
criticize Massachusetts v. EPA
68 may be understood to make a fair point in their turn. 
The  Court’s  prophylactic  holding  (on  this  interpretation,  putting  aside  the  other 
interpretations we have mentioned) is erroneous to the extent that it prevents agencies 
from offering reasonable, legitimate, and indeed common justifications for deciding not 
to decide at a certain time. As we have seen, agencies are usually permitted to offer 
many such justifications, including but not limited to concerns about limited resources. 
The problems introduced by what we are describing as the Court’s prophylactic holding 
are unnecessary and avoidable if and so long as the concern over circumvention can be 
accommodated  in  a  more  targeted,  narrowly  tailored  fashion.  We  think  that  it  can. 
Courts need not use such a drastic prophylactic approach; rather they can examine the 
relationship between the underlying statute and the agency’s explanation to give more 
fine-grained answers.  
 
If, for example, a statute requires the agency to make some finding of fact as a 
predicate for deciding whether to take action, and imposes a deadline on the agency, 
the agency cannot simply refuse to make that finding.
69 The same conclusion might well 
hold if the statute requires the agency to act but does not impose an explicit deadline, 
as in the genocide case. When a statute explicitly says that the agency “shall” make a 
determination, or else says the same by necessary implication, the agency is engaged 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
68 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note __ (manuscript at 47, 53-54). 
69 Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 892, 900 (2d Cir 1989). 21 
in circumvention if it fails to act on the ground that it disagrees with Congress’ policy 
judgment. 
 
To be clear, the content of the resulting obligation imposed on the agency is not 
that  the  agency  has  to  “regulate”  or  “take  action”  or  anything  of  the  sort.  What  the 
agency  must  do  is  to  engage  in  first-order  decisionmaking,  through  the  ordinary 
procedures of rulemaking or adjudication. If the express or implied statutory command 
is  to  make  rules,  the  agency  will  have  to  initiate  (say)  notice-and-comment  in  the 
ordinary fashion, receiving and responding to comments. Doing so guarantees that the 
agency is not using non-decision as a device of circumvention.  
 
Yet it is an entirely separate question -- an ordinary administrative-law question -- 
whether the agency, upon making a first-order decision, has any obligation to regulate, 
or  not,  to  take  action,  or  not.  That  question  depends  upon  the  agency’s  statutory 
discretion  (under  Chevron),  on  whether  it  has  considered  relevant  factors  (under 
Overton  Park)  and  on  whether  it  has  rationally  analyzed  relevant  policy  alternatives 
(under State Farm
70). For example, an agency might be required to make some finding 
of fact on a scientific question, but it might find a fact that obliges it to do nothing. When 
the  agency  has  arrived  at  this  ordinary  first  level  of  decisionmaking,  the  anti-
circumvention principle has already done its work and dropped out of the picture. We 
will explore examples below. 
 
D. Anti-Abdication 
 
  1. The central idea. The final principle we will examine is a generalization from 
Heckler  v.  Chaney.  Recall  that  the  Heckler  Court  raised  the  possibility  that  the 
presumption of non-reviewability for agency enforcement decisions could be overcome 
on a showing that the agency had abdicated its statutory responsibilities.
71 The Court 
did not decide that issue, but it did cite, with apparent approval, a court of appeals case 
that reviewed, and invalidated, an agency’s apparently wholesale refusal to implement a 
civil rights statute over a long period of time.
72 Lower court decisions have not greatly 
clarified the meaning of the “abdication” exception to the presumption of unreviewability, 
but the exception appears to be alive and well.
73  
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70 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983). 
71 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4  (1985) (noting that the presumption of unreviewability 
would not apply in “a situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has consciously and 
expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory 
responsibilities.”). 
72 Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
73 Many cases have noted Heckler’s anti-abdication exception to the presumption of unreviewability for 
enforcement decisions, although most of the cases -- quite appropriately -- decline to find a policy of 22 
 
As potential examples, imagine a failure of the Department of Justice to issue a 
rule to implement the Prison Rape Elimination Act,
74 or a refusal by the Federal Reserve 
Board to promulgate rules to implement core provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
75 or a refusal by the Department of Health and 
Human Services to issue rules to implement the Affordable Care Act.
76 As we have 
suggested, such cases are straightforward in the face of statutory deadlines or in the 
face of evident circumvention (made clear by the statutory text and context). But even 
without  deadlines  or  such  circumvention,  might  agencies  be  forbidden  from  moving 
certain statutes indefinitely to the end of the queue, and in that sense abdicating their 
statutory responsibility? 
 
The question generalizes beyond the enforcement setting. In particular, there is 
or should be an analogous principle for rulemaking and indeed for all agency action, in 
any form. Suppose that a statute gives the agency discretion to make decisions whether 
to decide, and that the agency offers valid reasons -- related to resource-allocation and 
priority-setting -- for deferring the relevant decisions. Suppose also, however, that the 
agency repeatedly gives those same reasons, repeatedly moving the decision to the 
back of the queue. Over time, the consequence will be that the statutory scheme is 
effectively nullified, in practice if not openly. The question of judicial enforcement is real, 
for reasons that we will explore. But if so, there may well be a strong argument that the 
agency is violating the underlying statute. 
 
Nothing in this proposition is inconsistent with the suggestion that agencies have 
valid, and broad, discretion to set priorities. Imagine that a theater or an airline has 
limited seating, and has broad discretion under the law to set rules for the order in which 
customers  may  enter.  Perhaps  first-come,  first-seated  is  the  rule;  perhaps  there  is 
special early entry for the disabled; perhaps those who pay more are entitled to enter 
first. But if particular customers are eternally shoved to the very back of the line, they 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
abdication. See, e.g., Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1256-58 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005); Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 165-71 (2d Cir. 2004) (considering a potential case 
of abdication but holding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not abdicate its responsibility to 
keep nuclear plants safe by declining to initiate enforcement in one case); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
F.E.R.C., 252 F.3d 456, 460-61 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (FERC’s decision to settle a case was not an abdication); 
Sierra  Club  v.  Larson,  882  F.2d  128,  132-33  (4th  Cir.  1989)  (holding  that  FHWA  did  not  abdicate 
responsibility  to  control  advertising  along  highways);  Mass.  Pub.  Interest  Research  Grp.,  Inc.  v.  U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 852 F.2d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 1988). In N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 782 
F.2d 730, 745-46 (7th Cir. 1986), the court embraced the anti-abdication principle, holding an agency 
nonenforcement decision arbitrary and capricious, but without citation to Heckler’s footnote. 
74 Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (2003). 
75 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
76 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 23 
may justly begin to suspect that the something else is at work and that the real priorities 
were never the stated priorities.  
 
2.  Rules,  standards,  and  administrability.  To  see  the  argument  for  an  anti-
abdication principle, both here and in the related setting of Heckler v. Chaney, imagine 
a simpler, more easily administrable, and more rule-based approach. On that approach, 
agencies  are  entitled  to  defer  decisions,  or  not  to  decide,  unless  Congress  sets  an 
explicit statutory deadline (mandating that the agency “shall” or “must” decide, one way 
or another, by a date certain) or requires a decision by necessary implication (as in the 
“genocide”  case).  In  the  absence  of  such  constraints,  agencies  have  perpetual  and 
unbounded discretion to move issues to the back of the queue. The responsibility would 
lie  on  Congress  to  force  the  issue  to  the  top  of  the  agency’s  agenda  by  express 
language.  If  Congress  merely  says  that  an  agency  “may”  address  a  problem  or  is 
“authorized” to adopt rules with respect to a certain problem, on this view, the agency 
may  simply  decide  to  keep  the  problem  at  the  back  of  the  queue  forever,  perhaps 
because of continuing resource constraints, or perhaps because the agency thinks the 
problem is not a real one, and that Congress was wrong to think that the problem might 
be worth addressing. 
 
An approach of this kind is not entirely without appeal. Among other things, it 
would make it unnecessary for courts to explore some hard questions -- what, exactly, 
is abdication, and when, exactly, can it be said to occur? -- and it would put Congress 
on clear notice about what it must do to compel decisions. But for some statutes, such a 
regime  would  not  represent  a  sensible  reading  of  congressional  instructions,  and  it 
would  put  to  Congress  a  kind  of  a  Hobson’s  choice:  issue  an  express  or  implied 
command to move an issue up the agenda, or else abandon all control of the agency’s 
agenda in perpetuity. Even if Congress desires neither extreme, the moderate course is 
in effect foreclosed.  
 
In other words, a regime of this sort may indirectly require Congress to exert 
more  control  over  the  agency’s  agenda  than  Congress  desires.  Suppose  that  with 
respect to a given issue, Congress thinks as follows (personifying Congress for ease of 
exposition): “We think there might be a problem, P; we’re not sure, and we want the 
agency to take a look to decide whether P is indeed a problem. But we don’t want to 
dictate exactly when the agency must look at P, even with an outer deadline; and we 
don’t want the agency to have to drop or sideline other priorities in order to focus on P. 
On the other hand, we don’t want the agency to ignore the issue until the end of time. 
What we want -- and we mean this to be vague -- is for the agency to give the issue its 
due place on the agenda, to give the issue its due weight as a potential problem, and to 
move the P-decision along in the queue in the ordinary way.” A regime with an anti-24 
abdication principle makes this tempered approach possible, whereas the simpler rule-
based regime constrains Congress either to do more, or to do nothing at all. It thereby 
prevents Congress from adopting a moderate course. 
 
The resulting tradeoff, of course, is a familiar one -- a choice between standards 
and rules. The regime with the anti-abdication principle requires a more complex inquiry 
and thus demands more of courts (and of agencies as well, forced to decide when they 
may no longer keep certain problems at the back of the queue). We have said that it 
may well be unclear, in the abstract, when the agency should be deemed to have acted 
legitimately or instead to have abdicated. Faced with a claim of abdication, the court will 
have to examine a long and detailed course of agency behavior to see whether the 
agency is repeatedly shuffling the question to the end of the queue. And in some cases, 
such shuffling might be permissible -- as, for example, where a single provision of a 
lengthy statute does not seem, to the agency, to warrant its attention. The simpler rule-
based regime would pretermit that inquiry and thus be easier for courts to apply.  
 
Yet whatever the abstract virtue of rules in this setting, administrative law has 
already crossed that bridge. Heckler suggests that even in the enforcement context, 
where agency discretion to set priorities is at a maximum, it is worthwhile for courts to 
take on the burden of applying an anti-abdication principle -- in the form of a standard -- 
as a backstop. In the enforcement setting, likewise, we could imagine a simpler regime 
in  which  enforcement  discretion  is  unbounded  unless  Congress  commands 
enforcement expressly or by necessary implication. The Court, however, suggested the 
possibility that an additional anti-abdication backstop might be justified, and the lower 
courts  have  said  that  it  is  in  many  cases;  a  fortiori,  an  analogous  judgment  seems 
plausible here. And even if judicial enforcement of an anti-abdication principle seems 
difficult, at least it is important for the executive branch to recognize, in virtue of its 
obligation  to  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed,
77 that  abdication  would 
betray Congress’ legitimate instructions. 
 
3.  Content.  The  content  of  the  obligation  resulting  from  the  anti-abdication 
principle is strictly procedural. It is an obligation to decide the issue -- eventually, when 
the issue is given its due place on the agenda and naturally rises to the top -- through 
ordinary processes of rulemaking or adjudication. In the notice-and-comment setting, 
the agency will have to solicit and respond to comments on whether P is a problem, and 
if it is, what if anything to do about it. Nothing in that obligation necessarily requires the 
agency to “regulate” P; whether it must do so is an independent question of ordinary 
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77 See U.S. CONST. art. II. 25 
administrative law.
78 If the agency considers the factors made relevant to the first-order 
decision by statute, and gives rational reasons for deciding to do nothing, that is the end 
of the matter. The anti-abdication principle was already appeased, and made irrelevant, 
when the issue P was brought up for full consideration. 
 
Most generally, the anti-abdication principle constrains priority-setting in order to 
create  a  prophylactic  measure  against  perpetual  circumvention.  Recall  that  the  anti-
circumvention principle applies where it is clear, from the statutory text and context, that 
agencies  must  act;  the  anti-abdication  principle  is  a  backstop  where  such  clarity  is 
absent. Courts may not be able directly to observe abdication by agencies, but must 
use  indirect  proxies.  Indefinite  delay  of  the  implementation  of  a  statutory  program 
suggests  agency  policy  disagreements  with  congressional  judgments  --  the  core 
concern  behind  the  anti-circumvention  principle  of  Massachusetts  v.  EPA.  The  anti-
abdication principle, however, improves on the overly broad prophylactic approach of 
Massachusetts v. EPA by providing a standard, rather than a rule, and thus sweeping in 
fewer  cases  in  which  agencies  genuinely  do  have  good  reasons  to  defer 
decisionmaking.  
 
This is of course a contestable judgment, with which others may disagree. A 
critical question is whether courts applying the anti-abdication principle will be able to 
sort abdication from genuinely justified delay with sufficient accuracy (low error costs) 
and  without  excessively  burdensome  inquiry  (low  decision  costs),  relative  to  the 
prophylactic  alternative  (or  to  an  approach  that  does  not  include  an  anti-abdication 
principle).
79 There is no way to prove in the abstract that this is or is not possible or 
likely. However, we can motivate our judgment by offering an example: the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas.
80 In that case, the court 
rejected the EPA’s claim that it had unreviewable discretion to decide whether to make 
a  decision  to  revise  national  ambient  air  quality  standards.  The  court  said  that  “the 
Administrator  must  make  some  decision  regarding  the  revision.”
81 Having  published 
scientific documents on the subject (as it was required to do), it “triggered a duty to 
address and decide whether and what kind of revision is necessary.”
82 And to those 
who remain concerned about the genuine difficulty of judicial enforcement of an anti-
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78 The agency must of course comply with any statutory instructions relevant to the merits, including 
specification  of  relevant  factors  (or  exclusion  of  irrelevant  factors).  We  abstract  from  that  separate 
question in order to focus on the decision to decide. 
79 See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 
885 (2003). 
80 870 F.2d 892 (2d Cir 1989). 
81 Id. at 896. 
82 Id. at 900. 26 
abdication principle, we emphasize that the principle might be adopted by agencies who 
are concerned to comply with their statutory responsibilities. 
 
III. Cases, Easy and Potentially Hard 
 
  With these principles in hand, let us return to the sort of problems that we laid out 
at the beginning. Some of the cases are easy; others are potentially hard (depending on 
the details). No set of principles can produce an infallible algorithm, but the principles 
can structure the analysis and specify what one would have to know, or decide, in order 
to resolve the hard cases. We go further, however, and indicate how, in our view, the 
cases should be resolved, whether they are easy or hard. 
 
A. Easy Cases 
 
(1) A statute requires the FDA to issue certain tobacco-related regulations by a 
specific date. The FDA fails to do so. It has a number of regulations to consider; it 
believes that the relevant regulations are not of the highest priority; and it wishes to 
focus  on  other  matters.  This  is  an  easy  case.  The  FDA  must  respect  a  statutory 
deadline.  Clear  statutes  trump  the  resource-allocation  principle.  To  be  sure,  any 
litigation  may  pose  difficult  issues  of  standing,  reviewability,  and  remedy.
83 But  the 
unlawfulness of the agency’s decision is plain. 
 
(2) A statute requires the FDA to issue certain tobacco-related regulations by a 
specific date, but adds that if it fails to do so, it must notify the Majority and Minority 
Leaders of the Senate and the House; the notification must explain the reasons for its 
failure to issue the regulations. The context makes it clear that the FDA need not issue 
the regulations if it is able to produce an adequate explanation of its failure to do so. 
The FDA misses the statutory deadline and also fails to issue the required notice. This 
is an easy case; the FDA is acting unlawfully. 
 
(3)  Same  as  (2),  except  the  FDA  produces  the  notice,  explaining  that  the 
underlying  issues  are  exceedingly  difficult  and  the  FDA  continues  to  work  on  them. 
Unless the explanation is a mere façade, the FDA has acted lawfully. 
 
(4)  Return  to  the  genocide  case,  discussed  earlier.  As  the  case  has  been 
constructed,  the  Department  is  behaving  unlawfully,  because  it  is  circumventing  the 
plain  requirements  of  the  statute.  Its  justification  has  nothing  to  do  with  resource 
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83 See, e.g., Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166,  1171-73, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2002); In 
re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74-77 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 
F.2d 70, 79-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. C 12-4529 PJH, 2013 WL 1741816, 
at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013). 27 
allocation; the rationale is premised solely on disagreement with a policy judgment that 
Congress was entitled to make, and did make. The structure of the statute necessarily 
implies that the relevant agency will make a decision, one way or another, about the 
critical question, at least within a reasonable time. 
 
(5) The Clean Air Act requires EPA to make a determination about whether to 
revise  national  ambient  air  quality  standards  every  five  years.
84 With  respect  to 
particulate matter, the EPA fails to make that determination by the specified deadline. It 
contends that it is continuing to study the underlying science. As in case (1), the agency 
is violating a clear statutory command and therefore acting unlawfully. 
 
(6)  A  statute  authorizes  the  EPA  to  issue  certain  regulations  when,  and  only 
when, the benefits justify the costs.
85 The EPA declines a petition to initiate rulemaking 
under that statute, explaining that the costs of any resulting regulation would exceed the 
benefits. The explanation might be questioned on the merits, but so long as it is not 
arbitrary, the agency’s decision will stand. (This is a clear inference from Massachusetts 
v. EPA, because the agency has acted on the basis of statutorily relevant factors.) 
 
(7) The Food and Drug Administration has been petitioned to begin a rulemaking 
to require genetically modified foods to be labeled. It declines on the ground that it lacks 
the statutory authority to do so, finding that genetically modified food is not relevantly 
different  from  other  food,  and  contending  that  labeling  cannot  be  required  in  the 
absence of such differences.
86 If its interpretation of the statute is valid, it has acted 
lawfully. 
 
B. Potentially Hard Cases 
 
(8) Same as (3), except that food safety groups believe, not implausibly, that the 
delay  will  be  indefinite  and  that  the  FDA  has  concluded  that  the  tobacco-related 
regulations would not be a good idea. In their view, the reason for the delay is FDA’s 
rejection of Congress’ judgment in favor of those regulations (which are, by hypothesis, 
mandatory). If they are right, this may well be a case of circumvention, though it might 
be difficult for a court to be confident about that conclusion in the face of an apparently 
reasonable explanation by the FDA. An additional question is whether the statute, by 
allowing the FDA to explain its inaction to the Senate and the House, actually authorizes 
the FDA to conclude (on the basis of a suitable explanation) that regulations are not a 
good idea. 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
84 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (2012). 
85 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
86 See supra note ___. 28 
 
(9)  A  statute  authorizes  the  Department  of  Transportation  to  issue  rules  to 
promote  highway  safety.  Truck  drivers  want  the  Department  to  issue  new  rules  to 
increase the safety of heavy-duty vehicles. The Department declines on the ground that 
it has limited resources and is focused on other problems that seem to it more pressing 
– in part because it must meet statutory deadlines, in part because the Administration 
as  a  whole  is  prioritizing  those  other  problems,  in  part  because  the  other  problems 
require prompt resolution.  
 
The  Department  has  acted  lawfully.  It  is  permitted  to  devote  its  resources  to 
those  problems  that  seem  to  it  most  serious,  at  least  where  (1)  Congress  has  not 
specified that it must act by a date certain; (2) Congress has not enacted instructions 
necessarily premised on the agency making a decision, one way or another; and (3) 
there is no reason to suspect the Department of permanently abdicating its authority to 
promote highway safety. The case is potentially difficult only because of Massachusetts 
v. EPA and the need to investigate the precise relationship between the statute and the 
Department’s justification.   
 
(10) Same as (9), except that the Department emphasizes not limited resources, 
but the existence of a well-functioning market for safety, the absence of any kind of 
market failure that might justify regulation, and also the difficulties faced by the trucking 
industry and the Department’s desire to avoid regulation that would compound those 
difficulties.  Emphasizing  the  importance  of  acting  only  in  the  face  of  a  clear  market 
failure,  the  Department  argues  broadly  that  where  Congress  has  not  imposed  a 
statutory deadline, or used the word “shall,” it is authorized to defer action on grounds of 
this sort.  
 
Whether this case is difficult, and how difficult it is, depends on the underlying 
statute and the agency’s precise rationale. To be sure, the Department is on stronger 
ground that in the “genocide” cases, where, by hypothesis, some kind of action is a 
necessary implication of the statute. But if the Department is effectively relying on a 
broad judgment that exercising its statutory authority to regulate highway safety is a bad 
idea, from the social point of view, it would appear to be circumventing the underlying 
statute  (and  perhaps  abdicating  its  statutory  authority).  This  conclusion  would  be 
easiest to reach if the Department is (1) claiming that a market failure is a predicate for 
regulation and (2) denying that any such failure can be found in a domain in which (3) 
Congress has clearly reached the contrary conclusion. 
 
(11)  Same  as  (9),  except  that  the  Department  relies  on  a  much  narrower 
argument, to the effect that in the current economic environment, it is appropriate to 29 
defer action on the particular rule in question. If the Department’s judgment is genuinely 
one of timing, and based on an economic situation that is temporally bounded, it is on 
much firmer ground. 
 
(12) Same as (7), except that the FDA says that it will not exercise its discretion 
to begin a rulemaking to require labeling of genetically modified food (assuming that it 
has statutory authority so to require). The agency’s rationale is that it does not want to 
compromise our relationships with our trading partners.  The agency argues that where 
Congress has not imposed a statutory deadline, or used the word “shall,” the FDA is 
authorized to defer action on grounds of this sort.  
 
The case is close to Massachusetts v. EPA, and under the Court’s ruling, the 
FDA seems to be acting inconsistently with law. But as we have indicated, there is good 
reason to think that Massachusetts v. EPA is overbroad on this score, inconsistent with 
the  larger  structure  of  administrative  law,  and  (thus)  vulnerable  to  subsequent 
reconsideration. Certainly the few relevant decisions to date in the courts of appeals 
have  more  or  less  ignored  that  aspect  of  Massachusetts  v.  EPA.
87  Absent  a 
demonstrable  problem of circumvention -- which is not evident on the facts as stated -- 
we believe that they are correct to have done so. 
 
(13) Same as (5), except that there is no deadline. After five years, EPA declines 
to make a determination about particulate matter, saying that it is attending to more 
serious issues that deserve its current attention. On its face, and for reasons we have 
elaborated, the refusal to take action is lawful. But at some point -- exactly when is 
unclear, difficult, and highly fact-specific -- there is a reasonable argument that courts 
should  be  prepared  to  entertain  an  argument  that  EPA  has  abdicated  its  statutory 
responsibilities.  
 
(14)  Same  as  (13),  except  that  EPA  declines  to  make  a  determination  about 
particulate matter, saying that the costs of any action would exceed the benefits, and 
the agency does not want to take cost-unjustified action “at the present time.” If the 
agency is setting priorities in the face of limited resources, this is a legitimate approach, 
subject to the objection that deferring action “at the present time” cannot become an 
indefinite excuse for delay. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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Agencies must often decide when to decide, and whether to act imminently or 
instead to defer their decisions. Much of the agencies, agencies say “not now.” Indeed, 
such  decisions  are  among  the  most  common  and  important  that  agencies  make. 
Because agencies have limited budgets and a large menu of alternatives, it is generally 
necessary,  and  therefore  legitimate,  for  them  to  set  priorities.  The  need  for  priority-
setting in the face of limited budgets ensures that agencies will make judgments about 
which problems are most pressing and which are properly deferred for another day.  
 
Contrary to the apparent holding of Massachusetts v. EPA, agencies are entitled 
to decide whether to proceed for reasons that would not be legally relevant if they were 
deciding how to proceed -- certainly if they are setting priorities in the face of scarce 
resources. Going beyond this principle, we have suggested that even if agencies are 
not animated by a concern about scarce resources, they may legitimately decide to 
defer decisions on the ground that for any number of reasons, the timing is not right. 
 
  There are three main constraints on agency discretion in this area. First, and 
most  obviously,  agencies  must  obey  clear  statutory  deadlines.  Realistically,  such 
deadlines will account for most cases involving unlawful decisions to defer. Second, 
agencies must obey a more general anti-circumvention principle. Although it is neither 
necessary  nor  sufficient,  the  word  “shall”  is  a  good  indicator  that  agencies  are 
constrained in their ability to defer decisions, certainly not for lengthy periods of time. In 
other cases, the statutory scheme will best be read to contain an implicit, but necessary 
and  unavoidable,  command  that  agencies  must  make  a  determination  one  way  or 
another  (as  in  the  genocide  example  we  have  discussed).  Third,  agencies  may  not 
abdicate their statutory authority, even if Congress has used the word “may “ rather than 
“shall.”  
 
The anti-circumvention and anti-abdication principles are hardly self-defining. To 
apply them, it will be necessary to explore both the statutory context and the particular 
grounds for the agency’s decision to defer its decision. In some cases, the problem of 
judicial administrability will be formidable, especially when it is alleged that agencies 
have  abdicated  their  authority;  in  some  cases,  agencies  may  be  violating  their 
obligations even though courts will not and should not say so. Nonetheless, the anti-
circumvention and anti-abdication principles have the signal virtue of recognizing the 
ultimate primacy of congressional instructions, while also acknowledging the inevitability 
and the legitimacy of a large measure of what amounts to policymaking discretion on 
the part of agencies. 
 